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Abstract 
This paper focuses on stability and change in “mixed middle-income” neighborhoods.  We first 
analyze variation across nearly two decades for all neighborhoods in the U.S. and the Chicago 
area. We then analyze a new longitudinal study of almost 700 Chicago adolescents over an 18-
year span, including their neighborhood income experiences during the transition to young 
adulthood.  The concentration of income extremes is highly persistent among neighborhoods, 
whereas mixed middle-income neighborhoods are more fluid.  Persistence dominates among 
individuals too, although Latino-Americans are much more likely than African-Americans or 
whites to be exposed to mixed middle-income neighborhoods in the first place and to transition 
into them over time, adjusting for immigrant status, education, income, and residential mobility.  
The results enhance our knowledge of the course of income inequality at the neighborhood level, 
and the endurance of concentrated extremes suggests that policies seeking to promote mixed-
income neighborhoods face greater odds than commonly thought. 
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Increases in income segregation, combined with the apparent loss of middle-class and mixed-
income neighborhoods, have generated considerable attention. Among scholars and the public at 
large, recent attention has been focused primarily on the pulling away of the very rich—the so-
called 1 percent (Piketty 2014). At the other end, a classic urban literature has produced a wealth 
of studies on concentrated poverty and the “truly disadvantaged” (Wilson 1987).1   
 Mixed-income housing has become a major policy paradigm that seeks to address such 
income extremes. Based on evidence that links concentrated poverty to compromised life 
outcomes, federal policy-makers in the United States have advocated moving poor people out of 
concentrated public housing and increasing the presence of higher-income neighbors through 
mixed-income redevelopment of high-poverty neighborhoods. Two examples of these arguments 
are the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD)’s “Moving to Opportunity” 
(MTO) voucher experiment, which sought to move the poor out of concentrated poverty; and 
HOPE VI, a place-based intervention that sought to increase income mixing in housing 
developments. With Mayor Bill de Blasio in New York City as the foremost example, city 
leaders around the country have also taken aim at policies to reduce residential inequality.2 
 Although neighborhood income mixing has surfaced as a favored policy tool and is the 
subject of growing scholarly discussion, research evaluating its sources and consequences is 
sparse. As a result, less is known about the nature of middle-income and mixed-income 
neighborhoods, and the experience of individuals transitioning into and out of the middle, rather 
than the extremes. The evidence that does exist has produced conflicting results (Joseph and 
                                                
 1 For a review of trends and an analysis of the increasing separation of poverty and 
affluence at the neighborhood level, see Reardon and Bischoff (2011).   
 
 2 Mixed-income housing is not without controversy. For a discussion of conflict in New 
York City’s efforts, see http://nyti.ms/1pDg4G5. 
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Chaskin 2012), and much of the writing about mixed-income neighborhoods is normative or 
aspirational rather than analytic (Cisneros and Engdahl 2009). There are also important untested 
assumptions and unanswered questions about neighborhood change (Joseph, Chaskin, and 
Webber 2007); for example, if a neighborhood is middle or working class and a mixed-income 
housing intervention brings lower-income residents, it is an open question whether the 
intervention would lead over time to the out-migration of existing middle-class residents or 
decreases in the in-migration of the nonpoor.  More generally, mixed-income policy implicitly 
assumes a kind of static equilibrium with regard to intervention effects. Equally important is the 
fact that proportionately few people live in planned mixed-income housing or HOPE VI 
neighborhoods. Like ethnically diverse communities (Ellen 2000), mixed-income neighborhoods 
that are “naturally occurring” are much more common, and yet we do not know much about their 
course of development—for individuals or at the neighborhood level.  
 
Framework and Research Approach 
This article focuses on the dynamics of what might best be characterized as “mixed middle-
income” neighborhoods: areas that are more evenly balanced than those at the extremes of either 
concentrated poverty or concentrated affluence and that have a reasonable mix among income 
groups, especially exposure of the poor to the middle and upper classes. Studying individual 
sorting and population flows into and out of mixed middle-income neighborhoods is fundamental 
to understanding neighborhood income inequality and, we argue, analytically necessary prior to 
assessing the impact of such neighborhoods on outcomes, whether at the individual or 
neighborhood level (see also Bruch and Mare 2006; Sampson and Sharkey 2008). We therefore 
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analyze variation in mixed middle-income neighborhoods at both the neighborhood and 
individual levels, placing our emphasis on patterns of stability and change. 
 We begin by defining and validating a measure of mixed-income neighborhoods; we then 
examine neighborhood-level transitions over the course of several decades. Although 
neighborhoods are constantly in flux, the evidence on the persistence of neighborhood poverty 
(Sampson 2012) leads to the hypothesis that mixed-income neighborhoods tend to occupy 
similar positions in the citywide distribution over time. However, gentrification and the 
demolition of public housing in cities such as Chicago may have altered this pattern. For 
example, are economically integrated neighborhoods stable, or merely in transition between low-
income and high-income areas? 
We focus on income mixing that is organic or “naturally occurring” in the sense that 
neighborhood income status is not defined based on local or federal housing policy interventions. 
There are good reasons for this analytic move. In Chicago, our study site and a city of more than 
2.7 million residents and a million housing units, we estimate that less than 5 percent of city 
residents lived in a census tract where a public housing project is located. If we restrict our 
concern to HUD’s HOPE VI housing program, the total number of units in mixed-income 
developments under the city’s “Plan for Transformation” is about 12,000, approximately 1 
percent of all housing units.  Moreover, the effort to provide new subsidized housing units has 
stalled (Moore 2013), and in fiscal year 2014, only about 2,600 mixed-income units were leased.  
 The prevalence and correlates of moving in and out of naturally occurring mixed-income 
neighborhoods therefore looms large and motivates the second and major part of our article. 
Here we focus on individual exposure to neighborhood income mixing, based on a new 
longitudinal survey of more than 700 adolescents originally living in Chicago in 1995 and 
4 
 
followed wherever they moved in the United States, with the most recent data collection ending 
in 2013. The study consists of a birth cohort followed up to 17 years of age and three later 
cohorts (ages 9–15) that were studied into young adulthood. Our central aim is to describe 
trajectories of neighborhood attainment for the young adult cohorts. They are of primary interest 
because we know the income status of both the neighborhood that their parents chose when 
respondents were children and the neighborhood that our respondents chose, or ended up in, 
during the critical transition to young adulthood (ages 25–32), which allows for an 
intergenerational perspective on neighborhood attainment. By contrast, the birth cohort members 
have not left their parents’ home.  
We first present descriptive patterns on trajectories of neighborhood mobility—how 
much stability or change is there in exposure to mixed-income areas? We focus primarily on 
race, cohort, and immigrant status as conditioning factors. Based on prior research, we expect 
that blacks and Latinos are disproportionately exposed to poverty compared to whites. However, 
we do not know how different racial/ethnic groups are exposed to mixed middle-income 
neighborhoods over time. Nor do we know if race/ethnic differences are attributable to pre-
existing differences in factors such as economic status or homeownership, or to time-varying 
factors such as residential mobility. Our last set of analyses thus examines the predictors of 
transitioning into mixed middle-income neighborhoods over young adulthood using a core set of 
theoretically selected characteristics.  
 
The Mixed-Income Project 
The larger project in which this study is embedded is the Mixed-Income Project (MIP), which 
was designed to examine neighborhood context, residential mobility, and mixed-income housing 
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in Chicago and Los Angeles. The two anchor studies that formed the backbone of MIP are the 
Project on Human Development in Chicago Neighborhoods (PHDCN) and the Los Angeles 
Family and Neighborhood Survey (LAFANS). The PHDCN and LAFANS are widely 
recognized for rich longitudinal data on neighborhoods and on educational, health, and 
behavioral outcomes. For present purposes, we focus on the city of Chicago and the PHDCN. 
 
Project on Human Development in Chicago Neighborhoods (PHDCN) 
The PHDCN is a longitudinal cohort study of 6,207 children and their caregivers based 
on a representative sample drawn from 80 neighborhood clusters (NCs) in Chicago in 1995. A 
two-stage sampling procedure was conducted. U.S. Census data were first used to identify 343 
NCs in the city of Chicago: groups of two to three census tracts containing approximately 8,000 
people that were relatively homogeneous with respect to racial/ethnic mix, socioeconomic status, 
housing density, and family structure. From these, a random sample of 80 of the 343 NCs was 
drawn within twenty-one strata defined by racial/ethnic composition (seven categories) and SES 
(socioeconomic status: high, medium, and low).  
 Second, within the sampled eighty NCs, children falling within seven age cohorts (0 
[birth], 3, 6, 9, 12, 15, and 18) were sampled from randomly selected households based on a 
screening of more than 35,000 households. Dwelling units were selected systematically from a 
random start within enumerated blocks. Within dwelling units, all households were listed, and all 
age-eligible children were selected with certainty. Multiple siblings were thus interviewed within 
some households. At baseline, the resulting PHDCN sample was 16 percent European American, 
35 percent African American, and 43 percent Latino, evenly split by gender, and representative 
of families living in a wide range of Chicago neighborhoods.  
6 
 
 Extensive in-home interviews and assessments were conducted with the sampled children 
and their primary caregivers three times over a seven-year period, at roughly 2.5-year intervals 
(wave 1 in 1995–1997, wave 2 in 1997–1999, and wave 3 in 1999–2001). Participants were 
followed no matter where they moved in the United States. Participation at baseline and retention 
at wave 3 were relatively high for a contemporary urban sample, 78 percent and 75 percent, 
respectively.  
 
MIP research design  
The MIP follow-up located and re-interviewed randomly sampled participants last 
contacted at wave 3 of PHDCN in the original birth cohort (now about age 16–17) and the age 9–
15 cohorts (now 26–32). These cohorts were selected to maximize variation in life-course 
experiences and because the age 18 cohort had the highest attrition rate at wave 3 and the MIP 
pilot test indicated that the age 3 and 6 cohorts were most difficult to locate. The Chicago field 
operation engaged in a multi-method tracking effort using electronic, phone-based, and in-person 
methods (e.g., knocking on doors). The majority of interviews were carried out in person (almost 
60 percent), but phone interviews were allowed if preferred by respondents or easier to 
implement. Despite the long time that elapsed since last contact at wave 3 and the contemporary 
big-city setting, MIP achieved a final response rate in the Chicago Main Study of 63 percent of 
eligible cases overall, yielding 1,057 respondents (40 percent Latino, 37 percent black, and 19 
percent white).  
For this article, we examine the 226, 236, and 217 respondents in the 9-, 12-, and 15-year 
old cohorts, respectively. These respondents spent their early years of development in an era that 
included the violence epidemic and severe urban challenges in Chicago, entered young 
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adulthood during the widespread crime decline, and then experienced their late 20s and early 30s 
in the era of the Great Recession. To capture exposure to neighborhood income mixing over this 
time span, we geo-coded addresses of the MIP sample to census tract boundaries and merged 
them with waves 1–3 of the PHDCN. Each individual was thus linked to a census tract for each 
of the four waves of the combined PHDCN-MIP survey.3 We then integrated census data across 
three decades and the American Community Survey (ACS) data from 2005–2009, 2006–2010, 
2007–2011, and 2008–2012.  
 
Mixed In the Middle 
A clear definition or consensus on measures of mixed-income neighborhoods is noticeably 
absent in past research, in part because income mixing and income inequality within 
neighborhoods are closely related yet distinct concepts. One way to think about income mixing is 
to focus solely on measures of income dispersion, but high values of inequality can be generated 
at the extremes of the neighborhood income distribution. For example, the Gini Index of income 
inequality, available in the ACS for 2007–2011, is highest in the poorest and richest census 
tracts, defined according to the lowest and highest quintiles of median income. This is not 
surprising, as there are very low and high incomes that stretch the distribution. But having a lot 
of variation at the high end is not what we would typically consider a desired outcome, at least in 
the world of mixed-income housing. A pragmatic mixed-income policy seeks to expose the poor 
                                                
3 The mobility of the sample reached well beyond the neighborhood clusters (themselves 
made up of census tracts) of the original PHDCN sampling design. We thus use census tracts to 
capture the income status of destination neighborhoods, assigning 2000 census tract boundaries 
for waves 1–3 and 2010 boundaries for wave 4. This strategy comports with past research and 
reflects the most accurate measure of the neighborhoods in which the participants were living at 
the time of each wave of data collection. For the neighborhood-level analyses we use 2000 
boundaries to track neighborhood change from 1990 to 2009. 
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to middle-class society—going from poverty to the “Upper East Sides” of the world is neither 
realistic nor necessarily desirable. It is thus hard to achieve a meaningful measure of mixed 
income absent a simultaneous focus on the level of income or where in the distribution a 
neighborhood is located.   
 After exploring multiple indicators of inequality and diversity, in addition to more 
traditional indicators of concentrated poverty and median income, we follow Massey (2001) by 
focusing on simplicity and clear metrics in defining the Index of Concentration at the Extremes 
(ICE) as !!!!!!! , where A is the number of affluent residents in neighborhood i, P is the number of 
poor residents in neighborhood i, and T is the total number of residents in neighborhood i. The 
ICE can theoretically range from –1 (where all residents are poor) to 1 (where all residents are 
affluent). Relatively greater income mixing, in the form of an even balance of poor and affluent 
residents, is centered at 0. Operationally, we calculate the ICE using the national upper- and 
lower-income quintiles of family income as the cutoffs for affluent and poor families, 
respectively, assigning an ICE score for each year from 1990 to 2010 (using interpolation) at the 
census tract–level in the Chicago area and for all neighborhoods in the United States. In addition 
to its clearly interpretable definition, the ICE controls for shifting income distributions over time.  
 The ICE classification is desirable because it focuses directly on income extremes, but it 
has potential limitations in distinguishing mixed-income areas from purely homogenous middle-
class areas. We therefore explored additional definitions of mixed-income neighborhoods using 
the Herfindahl index of income diversity, the Gini Index of income inequality, and the 
Interquartile Range (IQR) of income for each tract based on household income bins. The 
Herfindahl index is defined as 1− 𝑝!!!! , where income bins were based on quintiles. The 
Herfindahl index ranges from 0, indicating everyone living in the neighborhood is in just one 
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income category, to 1, indicating complete evenness across categories. The range of the index is 
limited by the number of categories used: with 5 categories, the index’s maximum value is 0.8.  
 Analysis of the Herfindahl index shows that the highest level of income diversity is in the 
mixed-income category of the ICE, indicating convergent validity. Also, as expected, the IQR is 
much higher in the middle category of the classification (where the ICE centers on 0) than in the 
low-income category, whereas the largest IQR (i.e., the largest absolute difference in 25th and 
75th percentile of incomes) is driven by the extremely high incomes found in the upper 20 
percent of the ICE, which denotes concentrated affluence. As noted earlier, the Gini Index is 
highest in the upper and lower fifths of neighborhood median income (.46) compared to the 
middle category (.41).4 At least in American society, it thus appears that the greatest exposure to 
mixed-income populations—especially among the poor or near poor—is found in the middle of 
the neighborhood ICE distribution, which also favors more equality.  
 To further explore this argument, we examined the observed amount of income mixing in 
our individual-level MIP sample according to the ICE classification. To do so we defined each 
MIP respondent in wave 1 by the quintile of household income and then compared the 
distribution of the sample across the quintiles of neighborhood ICE. The greatest income mix 
whereby individual poor residents are exposed to upper-income residents in roughly equal 
proportions is in our category of mixed middle-income, compared to more affluent or poverty 
areas. For example, 19 percent of MIP residents in the middle ICE category are low-income 
(lowest category of household income), compared to 17 percent affluent (highest category of 
                                                
 4 The entropy index is another candidate but it gives the highest value to neighborhoods 
that are 50 percent poor and 50 percent affluent, which is a very rare context. Of census tracts in 
Chicago with more than 40 percent affluent, for example, none have a percentage poor greater 
than 40 and just a handful have greater than 25. The middle of the ICE distribution captures 
50/50 splits but also the more realistic splits closer to 20 or 30 percent poor and 20 to 30 percent 
affluent.  
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household income)—a gap of just 2 percent.  Every other ICE category has larger gaps—
especially, not surprisingly, the lowest and highest categories of the ICE, where the absolute 
gaps are 37 and 43 percent, respectively. But even in ICE categories 2 and 4, the gaps are 
considerably higher: 26.2 and 9.1, respectively. We also calculated Herfindahl indices. 
Consistent with the above analysis, the highest level of income diversity is in category 3 of the 
ICE, at .79. Like the neighborhood level analysis for the United States and for Chicago Cook 
County, then, our individual-level sample validates the mixed middle-income classification. 
 
Neighborhood-Level Results 
Figure 1 shows the ICE distribution in Chicago’s Cook County, where more than 80 percent of 
our sample remained during the follow-up. The map is based on quintiles, corresponding to the 
five labeled neighborhood types, ranging from “homogenous low income” to “homogeneous 
high income.” The ACS estimates from 2008–2012 reveal that 20 percent of family households 
earned less than $27,000 per year, and 81 percent earned less than $116,000 per year (in 2011 
dollars). We used these income thresholds to define poor and affluent households for computing 
the ICE for an examination of current income distributions. In Cook County, the ICE ranges 
from –0.85 to 0.70. The map illustrates the spatial variability in income mixing across 
neighborhoods. Some 18 percent of tracts in Cook County are mixed income, and approximately 
16 percent of the overall Chicago sample lives in the mixed middle-income category.  
FIGURE 1 
 
Are economically integrated neighborhoods stable, or merely in transition between 
relatively homogenous high- (or low) and low- (or high) income areas? The process of 
gentrification suggests a directional shift from lower to higher income areas, whereas a 
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neighborhood decline narrative suggests the reverse. An inspection of Figure 1 suggests that 
mixed-income areas in Chicago are more proximate to homogenously poor areas on the city’s 
South and West sides than to homogenously affluent areas, suggesting the potential fragility of 
mixed-income neighborhoods over time.  
We assess neighborhood dynamics in Figure 2 by displaying the relationship between the 
ICE indicator in 1990 and 2005–2009 for all census tracts in both Chicago/Cook County and the 
rest of the United States (N = ~ 64,000). There is a high degree of persistence revealed in both 
graphs, especially at the high end, with areas of concentrated affluence largely remaining 
affluent. Chicago is thus not unique, and if anything, the persistence of income extremes is 
higher outside the Chicago area. For non-Chicago/Cook County tracts, the Pearson’s and 
Spearman’s rank-order correlations are very high —.87 and .86, respectively. Chicago comes in 
lower but still high, at.77 and .78. There is also suggestive evidence of gentrification in the 
Chicago area—note the areas above the regression line in the upper left quadrant of Figure 2, 
representing poor neighborhoods that became more mixed income or affluent over time. Hwang 
and Sampson (2014) analyzed gentrification trajectories in Chicago and found that among 
neighborhoods that showed initial signs of gentrification in 1995 or that were nearby one 
another, trajectories of gentrification through 2009 were lower in areas with higher shares of 
blacks and Latinos—even after accounting for characteristics such as crime, poverty, and 
proximity to amenities.  
 Although there is some evidence of upgrading and probably gentrification in areas that 
were largely poor, the overall correlations and transition matrices indicate that “stickiness” is the 
general rule. Indeed, the correlation of ICE over a 19-year time span exceeds .75 in both Chicago 
and the entire country, and in both settings the majority of neighborhoods that are in the top or 
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bottom quintiles of income remain there. These patterns exist despite that inequality has been 
increasing at the top end (Reardon and Bischoff 2011)—the increase in the prevalence of rich 
neighborhoods does not override the strong inertial tendency of tracts to remain in a similar 
relative position over time.5  
FIGURE 2 
 
 In Table 1 we look at population data from the Chicago area another way in the form of a 
transition matrix from 1990 to 2005–2009 for quintiles of neighborhood ICE. Again we see 
evidence of greater persistence over time among neighborhoods at the extremes, with 65 percent 
or more of poor (lowest quintile) and affluent (highest quintile) neighborhoods remaining in the 
same category, compared to less than 30 percent of mixed middle-income neighborhoods. For 
the United States as a whole not counting the Chicago area, persistence is even greater—for 
example, 75 percent of affluent neighborhoods in 1990 remain affluent in 2007 and almost 70 
percent of poor areas remain so. 
TABLE 1 
 
 These aggregate-level findings suggest that mixed-income neighborhoods are closely 
connected to larger structures of urban inequality. They also suggest that within the current 
structures that we observed, inducing large changes in exposure to neighborhood income mixing 
will likely result from individual mobility into and out of neighborhoods, rather than from 
changes within neighborhoods for persons who do not move. This is not to say neighborhoods do 
not change; clearly they do, and gentrification is real. But when we do not select on change and 
                                                
5 We also decomposed the ICE into variability between census tracts and over time for all 
neighborhoods in the United States for the independent census years 1990, 2000, and 2005–
2009. The results revealed that 88 percent of variation is between neighborhoods. The same 
general pattern holds in Chicago. Thus the variability in concentrated income extremes is 
predominantly between neighborhoods rather than over time, which means that, consistent with 
Figure 2, relatively few neighborhoods are switching positions in the income distribution.  
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instead observe the universe of all neighborhoods either locally or nationally, we see strong 
evidence of the relative persistence of neighborhood position with respect to income.  
 
Individual-Level Transitions and Trajectories in Chicago 
The preceding analyses lead us to now consider individual-level trajectories of neighborhood 
income attainment. We ask, for example, how much change is there over time in the exposure of 
study participants to different income contexts, such as the transition from a poor neighborhood 
to a mixed-income or even affluent neighborhood? What is the profile of individuals who move 
into mixed middle-income neighborhoods over the life course of young adulthood? Is living in 
mixed-income areas a transitory state?  
 We begin with a transition matrix of individual exposure to concentrated poverty, 
concentrated affluence, and mixed middle-income neighborhoods over roughly an 18-year period 
(1995 to early 2013). Because we focus on the 9-, 12-, and 15-year-old cohorts, in effect we 
examine the transition from one’s neighborhood in adolescence (of parental choice) to the 
destination neighborhood in young adulthood (the study participant’s choice). As before, the 
neighborhood income measure is based on quintiles, but because study participants were free to 
move anywhere outside Chicago, we use national income distributions from 2012 to define the 
ICE quintiles.6 These prevalence data and all analyses to follow are weighted to account for the 
stratified sample design at wave 1 and for potential attrition bias over time in the follow up.7 
                                                
 6 To maximize the temporal match to the main MIP follow-up interview year in 2012, we 
use the ACS, 2008–2012.  Because the Chicago area is similar to the national distribution of 
income, the results are similar if we use the local (county-level) quintile distribution.  
 
 7 The sampling weight is designed to adjust for the original stratification of the PHDCN 
by neighborhood SES and racial composition, along with the age-cohort selection and a post-
stratification of population weights to census estimates of the age, gender, and race/ethnicity 
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 The results in Table 2 demonstrate that there is considerable inertia in the residential 
exposure of our sample at the low and high values of the ICE. Indeed, despite that there are five 
income categories, fully 61 percent of respondents who live in neighborhoods in the lowest ICE 
quintile at wave 1 remain in neighborhoods in the lowest ICE quintile almost two decades later at 
wave 4: in this sense, concentrated poverty exposure is durable. At the affluent extreme, just over 
41 percent of respondents who live in neighborhoods in the top 20 percent of the ICE distribution 
at wave 1 remain there at wave 4 and another 34 percent end up in the next lowest category; thus 
only about a quarter of this group was significantly downwardly mobile.   
TABLE 2 
   
 By contrast, considerable fluidity characterizes the middle of the distribution. Based on 
our earlier analysis, we define mixed-income neighborhoods as those falling between the second 
and third quintile of the ICE. Higher shares of respondents living in mixed-income 
neighborhoods at wave1 experience a change in neighborhood income mix by wave 4 than do 
respondents who live in more homogenous lower or higher income neighborhoods at wave 1. We 
see this pattern from the fairly even distribution of values in the column corresponding to 
residence in ICE category 3 at wave 1. The values in this column are more similar to each other 
than the values in other ICE quintile columns. In fact, only 21 percent of respondents who live in 
                                                                                                                                                       
distribution of children in the City of Chicago in 1995. The attrition weight is defined as the 
inverse of the probability of being interviewed at wave 4 conditional on being in the study at 
wave 3. To model the probability of attrition at wave 4, missing data from waves 1 through 3 
were first multiply imputed using chained regression equations. Attrition weights were then 
calculated by estimating a logit model for the probability of attrition at wave 4, based on 
individual- and household-level measures (e.g., socioeconomic status and family structure) as 
well as neighborhood-level measures of demographic composition and social processes (such as 
collective efficacy and perceived violence). The inverse of each subject's probability of response 
was then calculated and standardized by the mean to yield the final attrition weights. The 
stratification and attrition weights were multiplied to produce the final weight. We examined 
results separately using the baseline stratification weights and attrition-based weights, but the 
patterns were very similar; therefore, we present data based on the final weights. 
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mixed-income neighborhoods at wave 1 remain in mixed-income neighborhoods at wave 4. This 
percentage is considerably lower than the share of respondents who start and end in more 
homogenous lower- or higher-income neighborhoods; continuous exposure to mixed-income 
areas is relatively rare—only 5 percent of our respondents live in mixed-income neighborhoods 
at both waves 1 and 4, whereas 65 percent of our respondents do not live in mixed-income 
neighborhoods at either wave. The balance, nearly a third of the sample (30 percent), transitions 
into or out of mixed-income neighborhoods between 1995 and 2012, once again suggesting 
fluidity in exposure to mixed-income neighborhoods.8   
 It is important to note that in Table 2 we used the national distribution of the ICE to 
determine the quintile cut points. Based on the national distribution, our mixed-income category 
consists of neighborhoods with ICE scores between –0.08 and 0.06 in 1995 and –0.06 and 0.10 
in 2012. To test whether the results are sensitive to this definition, we examined ICE cut points 
based on the weighted distribution of sample respondents by the neighborhoods they lived in at 
waves 1 and 4. In this more local specification that is dominated by Chicago and its suburbs, the 
mixed-income category of neighborhoods includes those neighborhoods with ICE scores 
between –0.17 and –0.04 in 1995 and –0.19 and 0.03 in 2012. However, this definition does not 
alter our main findings about exposure to mixed-income neighborhoods.  By both the national 
distribution and sample-based definitions, 5 percent of respondents lived in mixed-income 
neighborhoods at both waves 1 and 4. While using the national distribution shows that 21 percent 
of respondents who start in mixed-income neighborhoods end up in mixed-income 
                                                
8 We also examined the Herfindahl index of income diversity defined earlier. Consistent 
with our typology, income diversity is significantly higher in the mixed-income (MI) category 
(.75) than the non-MI category (.68) in our wave 4 sample (t-ratio of difference = –9.81; p < .01).  
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neighborhoods, the corresponding statistic using the sample-based distribution is 24 percent. The 
basic pattern of exposure to mixed-income neighborhoods that we report above is thus robust to 
different cut points of the ICE variable. 
  Although revealing, the aggregate transition matrix in Table 2 conceals potential 
heterogeneity in exposure to poverty, affluence, and mixed-income areas by the race and 
ethnicity of the study participants. We thus examined exposure to our mixed-income 
classification of neighborhoods across the 18 years separately for Latinos, non-Latino blacks, 
and non-Latino whites. To simplify the data when looking at race and ethnicity, we examined a 
two-category classification that collapses the ICE quintiles into a mixed-income category versus 
all else. The results show that almost a third (29 percent) of young-adult Latinos who lived in 
mixed-income neighborhoods at wave 1 remained in mixed-income neighborhoods at wave 4, 
compared to only 18 percent of blacks and 13 percent of whites living in mixed-income 
neighborhoods at wave 1. Among respondents who do not live in mixed-income neighborhoods 
at wave 1, Latinos also have the highest rate of living in mixed-income neighborhoods at wave 4: 
23 percent, compared to 12 percent and 11 percent for blacks and whites, respectively. Exposure 
to mixed-income neighborhoods is lowest among blacks, 70 percent of whom did not live in 
mixed-income neighborhoods at either wave 1 or 4 (table not shown). The equivalent statistics 
for Latinos and whites are 56 and 66 percent. Based on these results, Latino-Americans, at least 
in Chicago, are much more exposed to mixed-income neighborhoods.9 
                                                
 9 We also examined the immigrant status of parents among Latinos; there was a similar 
level of consistent exposure to mixed-income neighborhoods when comparing the first 
generation to the second and third generations. There is a somewhat bigger difference in mixed-
income at wave 4 conditional on wave 1, with first-generation immigrants having a higher 
prevalence of living in mixed income at wave 4 conditional on wave 1.  
17 
 
 Another way to look at race differences is to examine the average trajectories of each 
group across the four waves of the MIP-Chicago study. Figure 3 presents the weighted trajectory 
results for ICE by race/ethnicity, with 95 percent confidence intervals shown for each group. In 
estimating these trajectories, we adjust for age cohort, homeowner status at wave 1, and parental 
immigrant status. As seen in Figure 3, the conditional mean differences among race/ethnic 
groups are quite stark at each wave of the study. Whites are much more likely to be exposed to 
higher values of concentrated affluence, and blacks to concentrated poverty (values of ICE below 
–.20). Latinos are again in the middle, with the final neighborhood attainment at nearly the 
middle (or .00) of the ICE distribution.   
FIGURE 3. 
 
 What is not yet clear is whether the consistent difference in experience we have observed 
so far among Latinos is a result of initial differences in socioeconomic status or different 
trajectories of residential mobility over time. In addition, we have not yet explored direct models 
of change in mixed-income exposure that simultaneously take into account demographic, 
socioeconomic, and residential mobility status. It is to these issues we now turn. 
 
Who transitions to a mixed middle-income neighborhood? 
Table 3 displays a series of models that predict whether our sample of young adults lives 
in a mixed-income neighborhood in 2012, controlling for baseline residence type in 1995. We 
are thus estimating a change model—that is, a model of who is most likely to transition into 
mixed-income residence over the course of the study. We begin with a logistic regression model 
that uses race, age, and residence in a mixed-income neighborhood at wave 1 to predict residence 
in a mixed-income neighborhood at wave 4.  The results in model 1 show that living in a mixed-
income neighborhood at wave 1 is positively related to living in a mixed-income neighborhood 
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at wave 4 (model 1, OR = 1.40), but the coefficient is not significant at conventional levels. 
Controlling for age and residence in mixed-income neighborhood at wave 1, however, Latinos 
are substantially (2.7 times) more likely than whites to live in a mixed-income neighborhood at 
wave 4. Blacks are no more likely than whites to live in a mixed-income neighborhood at wave 
4, and being in age cohort 12 compared to cohort 9 is only marginally associated with mixed-
income neighborhood residence at wave 4. 
TABLE 3.   
 
 Model 2 adds immigrant generation of the respondent’s parents to the model, capturing 
the immigrant context of the household in which the respondent was an adolescent. Compared to 
respondents with third-generation parents and controlling for race, age, and residence in a mixed-
income neighborhood at wave 1, respondents with first- and second-generation parents are no 
more or less likely to live in a mixed-income neighborhood at wave 4. Adding immigrant 
generation to the model also does not change the main result from model 1: Latinos compared to 
whites are significantly more likely to live in a mixed-income neighborhood at wave 4, but 
controlling for generational status actually increases the odds ratio for Latinos to 2.8. 
 In model 3, we add indicators of parental home ownership at wave 1 and whether the 
respondent lived in public housing at wave 2 (circa 1997). Neither growing up in a house that 
was owned nor living in public housing significantly predicts residence in a mixed-income 
neighborhood at wave 4, controlling for living in a mixed-income neighborhood at wave 1, race, 
age, and parent immigrant generation. The odds ratio for being Latino compared to being white 
remains substantial (3.2) after accounting for public housing and homeownership, while 
residence in a mixed-income neighborhood at wave 1 continues to be insignificant.  
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 Model 4 is restricted to respondents who at wave 1 lived in homes that were rented. 
Although this specification reduces our sample size considerably, the model is justified because 
public housing residents were by definition not owners. In this restricted model, public housing 
is still not significantly associated with ending up in a mixed-income neighborhood at wave 4.  
 We next created indicators of neighborhood mobility status in the first three waves of the 
PHDCN: stayers, or those who did not move out of their baseline neighborhood over the first 
three waves (approximately seven years); movers within Chicago in the same period; and movers 
outside of the city proper again over the same period. Approximately 60 percent of the 
adolescent sample stayed in their family neighborhood as they transitioned to young adulthood, 
just under a third moved between neighborhoods but stayed within Chicago, and 11 percent 
moved out of the city. When we add the two indicator variables for moving within Chicago and 
out of Chicago (with the reference category being stayers) to model 5 in Table 3, we see that 
mobility status out of the city is associated with 62 percent lower odds of living in a mixed-
income neighborhood compared to stayers; moves within the city are not significantly associated 
with mixed-income destinations. It appears that moving out of Chicago—mostly to the suburbs, 
but including regions around the country—is associated with increased odds of living in 
concentrated affluence and reduced odds of living in a mixed-income neighborhood. 
  The last model in Table 3 takes into account the relationship between family 
socioeconomic status during adolescence and residence in a mixed-income neighborhood at 
wave 4. To estimate this relationship, we include parental education and a series of dichotomous 
indicators for five categories of family income (with the reference group as those making less 
than $10,000 a year). Controlling for mixed-income neighborhood at wave 1, race, age, parent 
immigrant generation, and both homeownership and income status at wave 1, model 6 shows that 
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none of the income indicators are significant.10  Nor does parental education predict residence in 
a mixed-income neighborhood at wave 4. Including the socioeconomic status of the family of 
origin, therefore, does not alter our consistent findings that Latinos are three to four times more 
likely to live in a mixed-income neighborhood than are whites.  
One question remains. Because it is known that Latinos are disproportionately likely to 
live in neighborhoods with a greater Latino composition, do our findings then reflect a 
contextual compositional effect? For example, are Latinos simply more attracted to Latino areas? 
Building from the full specification in model 6, we re-estimated our results controlling first for 
percent Latino at baseline (1995) and then in the destination neighborhood (ACS 2008–2012). In 
neither case was percent Latino significant, but the individual-level odds ratios for Latinos 
compared to whites remained large and significant (2.96 and 3.4, respectively). In addition, we 
compared Latino composition by income quintiles for the United States and Chicago. In both 
cases, the percentage Latino is actually higher or the same in the first two quintiles. In fact, for 
the United States as a whole, percent Latino is twice as high in the bottom quintile compared to 
the mixed middle income. Like socioeconomic status, contextual ethnic composition thus does 
not explain the strong pattern of Latino transitions to mixed middle-income neighborhoods. 
                                                
 10 We also examined an alternative model where we substituted welfare (TANF) receipt 
by the parent at wave 1 for income. But like income, welfare did not predict living in a mixed 
middle-income neighborhood. In addition, although most covariates in Table 3 have only modest 
levels of missing data, we re-estimated all models using multiply imputed data to assess the 
robustness of results. We obtained substantively similar results. 
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Conclusion 
 
Increases in income segregation have generated considerable debate, especially the separation of 
the very rich from everyone else. But our analysis shows that separation at the top is expressed in 
stark spatial terms and that this has been the case for some time. Indeed, about 75 percent of all 
neighborhoods in the United States in the highest quintile of income in 1990 were still there 
almost two decades later. The concentration of poverty is also very persistent, with more than 70 
percent of poor neighborhoods remaining poor over time; for the Chicago area, two-thirds of 
both poor and affluent areas retained their position. Mixed-income neighborhoods that are 
naturally occurring are comparatively more unstable; there appears to be more churning or 
turnover in the middle of the neighborhood income distribution, rather than the rich and poor 
neighborhoods changing places. 
  How do individuals fare against this strong pattern of structural inequality? Surprisingly, 
much less is known about exposure to neighborhood income mixing across the life course. To 
correct this gap, we examined 671 adolescents in Chicago who were followed over an 18-year 
span as they transitioned to young adulthood. The results show that the concentration of income 
extremes is persistent in the lives of individuals almost as much as in neighborhoods. Exposure 
to mixed middle-income neighborhoods is more infrequent and unstable.  
 The persistence of concentrated income extremes suggests that policies seeking to 
promote mixed-income neighborhoods face greater odds than commonly thought. Yet one 
pattern deserves consideration in thinking about the stability of mixed-income areas. When we 
considered characteristics of the individuals in our sample, Latino-Americans were much more 
likely than African Americans or whites to be exposed to mixed middle-income neighborhoods 
in the first place and to transition into them over time, adjusting for immigrant status, education, 
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income, and residential mobility. Interestingly, this pattern is not explained by Latinos simply 
moving from or to neighborhoods with more Latinos.  
Although our results call for more probing, the influx of immigration from Latin 
American countries may be creating not only a more diverse society but inducing more income-
mixing in the middle of the income distribution, perhaps offsetting what would otherwise be 
larger losses in the middle class as income inequality and the spatial separation of the poor and 
affluent increase. Immigrant and ethnic diversity thus need to be central to any debate over 
income mixing; the “black and white” frame that has dominated the urban sociology literature 
for decades will not suffice to capture the neighborhood context of income mixing now.   
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TABLE 1 
Neighborhood-Level Transitions in Concentrated Income Extremes (ICE),  
Chicago/Cook County (N = 1,264 Census Tracts, 1990 to 2005-2009) 
 
 
 
Note: cell entries are the number of cases and column percent, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
2005-2009 1 2 3 4 5 Total
 ICE Quintiles
1 201 47 21 3 0 272
66.34 30.72 10.66 1.02 0 21.52
2 45 49 76 28 1 199
14.85 32.03 38.58 9.52 0.32 15.74
3 24 34 59 101 14 232
7.92 22.22 29.95 34.35 4.42 18.35
4 23 12 27 133 94 289
7.59 7.84 13.71 45.24 29.65 22.86
5 10 11 14 29 208 272
3.3 7.19 7.11 9.86 65.62 21.52
Total 303 153 197 294 317 1,264
100 100 100 100 100 100
               1990 ICE Quintiles
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TABLE 2 
   Individual-Level Transitions in Concentrated Income Extremes (ICE),  
Chicago Young-Adult Sample (N =671 Individuals, 1995-2013)  
 
 
 
Note: cell entries are the number of cases and column percent, respectively. 
 
 
  
Wave 4 1 2 3 4 5 Total
 ICE Quintiles
1 140 50 30 6 4 229
60.56 34.42 18.89 5.66 11.08 34.14
2 53 35 46 18 2 155
23.17 24.36 29.27 17.5 6.24 23.06
3 23 36 33 15 3 109
9.96 24.65 20.76 14.79 7.76 16.27
4 9 14 26 35 12 97
3.99 9.73 16.69 34.61 33.53 14.46
5 5 10 23 28 15 81
2.32 6.84 14.39 27.45 41.39 12.07
Total 231 145 157 101 37 671
100 100 100 100 100 100
            Wave 1 ICE Quintiles
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  TABLE 3  
Logistic Models Predicting Mixed Middle-Income Status at Wave 4 
 
    
           Models
Predictors (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mixed-Income Wave 1 1.402 1.381 1.376 2.471 1.317 1.182
[0.797, 2.469] [0.782, 2.439] [0.700, 2.704] [0.757, 8.069] [0.733, 2.364] [0.642, 2.174]
Latino 2.694** 2.851** 3.187** 1.845 2.927** 3.413**
[1.314, 5.523] [1.422, 5.719] [1.378, 7.372] [0.417, 8.159] [1.380, 6.209] [1.545, 7.541]
Black 1.165 1.147 0.889 0.652 1.142 1.227
[0.532, 2.548] [0.474, 2.774] [0.317, 2.497] [0.0809, 5.260] [0.455, 2.866] [0.479, 3.146]
Cohort 12 1.807+ 1.760+ 1.384 0.820 1.706+ 1.773+
[0.984, 3.318] [0.956, 3.239] [0.692, 2.770] [0.305, 2.201] [0.929, 3.133] [0.953, 3.298]
Cohort 15 0.922 0.914 0.728 0.798 0.881 0.898
[0.478, 1.779] [0.472, 1.769] [0.338, 1.565] [0.286, 2.225] [0.454, 1.709] [0.446, 1.809]
Parent 1st Generation 0.920 0.718 2.143 0.922 0.870
[0.415, 2.037] [0.270, 1.911] [0.412, 11.15] [0.403, 2.108] [0.374, 2.020]
Parent 2nd Generation 0.903 0.674 0.703 0.911 0.945
[0.327, 2.489] [0.215, 2.112] [0.114, 4.327] [0.333, 2.490] [0.357, 2.502]
Homeowner Wave 1 1.253 1.263 1.313
[0.662, 2.373] [0.696, 2.295] [0.639, 2.698]
Public Housing Wave 2 0.332 0.302
[0.0695, 1.589][0.0462, 1.969]
Moved in Chicago 0.769
[0.434, 1.364]
Moved outside of Chicago 0.383*
[0.160, 0.916]
Parent Education 1.042
[0.766, 1.418]
Household Income:
   $10,000-$19,999 0.547
[0.174, 1.724]
   $20,000-$29,999 1.852
[0.696, 4.929]
   $30,000-$39,999 1.290
[0.426, 3.906]
   $40,000-$49,999 1.103
[0.270, 4.515]
   >$50,000 1.273
[0.397, 4.080]
N 645 638 498 277 627 602
Exponentiated coefficients; 95% confidence intervals in brackets
+ p<0.10  * p<0.05  ** p<0.01
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FIGURE 1 
Mixed-Income Classification in Chicago and Cook County, 2008-2012 
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FIGURE 2 
Index of Concentrated Extremes (ICE) by Year, Chicago/Cook County and the Rest  
of the U.S. (N= 63,709 Census Tracts with 500 or More Population in 1990 and 2000) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
30 
 
FIGURE 3 
Chicago ICE Trajectories of Young-Adult Sample by Race/Ethnicity, 
Adjusting for Baseline Homeowner Status, Immigrant Generation, and Age (95% CI) 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
